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SLAVE MARRIAGES IN THE LAWS OF GORTYN: 
A MATTER OF RIGHTS?*
ABSTRACT: This article tackles the long-held view that slaves at Gortyn possessed legal privileges 
not found in most other Greek slave systems, namely formal, enforceable rights to marry and own 
property. Combining legal analysis with cross-cultural comparison, it is shown that the complex 
social arrangements within Gortyn’s slave population engendered a variety of problems relating 
to the property interests of slaveholders. Gortyn’s laws on slavery are thus primarily directed at 
clarifying these issues, not at validating or enforcing slave ‘rights.’ A comparative approach enables 
us to understand the rationale behind the complex ‘slave marriage’ arrangements that produced 
these legal quandaries.
Several provisions found within the laws of Gortyn1 refer to arrangements whereby slaves 
might marry another slave or a free person, beget children, and possess property. These 
provisions have been frequently interpreted as evidence for ‘rights’ held by Gortynian 
slaves, making them quite different from the so-called ‘chattel slaves’ of Classical 
Athens. In a widely read essay, M.I. Finley wrote the following of Gortynian slaves:
[T]he unfree had certain proprietary or quasi-proprietary rights unknown in Athens 
and many other classical cities. With these (and perhaps even more important) went 
certain personal rights, above all, the right of marriage. The rules regarding adultery, 
divorce and relations between douloi and free women leave no doubt that it is proper 
to speak of marriage here, of a relationship which was more than a contubernium, 
* Versions of this paper were delivered at Nottingham (February 2012) and Athens (September 
2012). I would like to thank Kostas Vlassopoulos, Stephen Hodkinson and Athina Dimpoulou for 
the respective invitations, and the audiences for their stimulating questions, which have helped me 
to reﬁ ne my thoughts. Peter Rhodes read a draft and I thank him for his advice. Special thanks are 
due to Edward Harris, who has read and commented on every draft of the essay; I should also like 
to thank the anonymous referees of the journal for their observations, and Emily West for advice on 
slavery in the Americas.
1 Translations of the Code are lightly adapted from R.F. Willetts, The Law Code of Gortyn (Berlin, 
1967); other translations are my own unless otherwise speciﬁ ed. Throughout, I refer to IC IV 72 as 
‘the Code’, purely for convenience. For the degree to which this term is strictly apposite, see J.K. 
Davies, ‘Deconstructing Gortyn: When is a Code a Code?’ in L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (edd.) 
Greek Law in its Political Setting (Oxford, 1996) 33–56; K.R. Kristensen, ‘Codiﬁ cation, Tradition 
and Innovation in the Law Code of Gortyn’ Dike 7 (2004) 135–68, at 136.
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because it created certain enforceable rights, but which was at the same time far 
less than a marriage between free persons.2
Finley’s assessment of these so-called marital and proprietary ‘rights’ has been largely 
accepted by modern scholars. The notion that Gortynian slaves could not merely marry 
and possess property, but had formal ‘rights’ in these respects has been endorsed in many 
studies3, including recent essays by scholars such as J.K. Davies4, K.R. Kristensen5 
and M. Gagarin6; and Finley’s belief that this kind of servile marriage was unusual 
outside Gortyn has been supported by scholars such as A. Mafﬁ 7 and E. Cantarella.8 
This article demonstrates something quite different: ﬁ rst, that the provisions relating to 
servile marriages in the Great Code (IC IV 72) show no interest in enumerating rights 
for slaves whatsoever; and secondly, that the servile marriage relationship for which 
this legislation was created was not a distinctively Gortynian institution but a common 
arrangement that can be found in many slave systems, which in its complex forms en-
genders a variety of knotty legal problems relating chieﬂ y to property. Whereas most 
scholarship on the Code has employed a traditional legal approach, this study, whilst 
utilising these tools, combines them with a comparative methodology to throw light 
upon these enigmatic provisions.
We begin, after introducing some basic features of the evidence and scholarship on 
the issue (part I), by looking at slave marriages and the possession of property by slaves 
in comparative perspective. This illustrates normative features of these phenomena in 
other historical slave systems and provides a benchmark against which to assess the al-
leged peculiarity of Gortyn (part II). Turning to the Gortynian texts, part III provides a 
2 M.I. Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, B.D. Shaw & R.P. Saller (edd.) (London, 1981) 
at 137 (originally published as ‘The Servile Statuses of Ancient Greece’ Revue internationale des 
droits de l’antiquité, 3e sér., 7 [1960] 165–89).
3 For example, Willetts, (n. 1) 14–15; W.L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiq-
uity (Philadelphia, 1955) 12; 16; 22–3; Y. Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece (Ithaca NY & London, 
1988) 100; E. Lévy, ‘Libres et non-libres dans le Code de Gortyne’ in Brulé, P. & J. Oulhen (edd.) 
Esclavage, guerre, économie en Grèce ancienne: Hommages à Yvon Garlan (Rennes, 1997) 25–41 
at 35; C. Brixhe–M. Bile, ‘La circulation des biens dans les Lois de Gortyne’ in Dobias-Lalou, C. 
(ed.) Des dialectes grecs aux lois de Gortyne (Nancy, 1999) 75–116 at 97; P. Perlman, Tinker, Tailor, 
Soldier, Sailor: The Economies of Archaic Eleutherna, Crete’ Classical Antiquity 23.1 (2004) 95–137 
at 110–11. S. Link, Das griechische Kreta (Stuttgart, 1994) 30–48 contains a variety of compelling 
criticisms of the notion of servile rights in Gortyn; this study builds upon his observations, but dif-
fers in a number of respects. 
4 J.K. Davies, ‘The Gortyn Laws’ in M. Gagarin & D. Cohen (edd.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge, 2005) 305–27 at 316–7.
5 K.R. Kristensen, ‘Gortynian Debt Bondage. Some New Considerations on IC IV 41 IV–VII, 47 and 
72 I.56–II.2, X.25–32’ ZPE 149 (2004) 73–9 at 79.
6 M. Gagarin, ‘Serfs and Slaves at Gortyn’ Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, 
Romanistische Abteilung 127 (2010) 14–31.
7 A. Mafﬁ , Il diritto di famiglia nel Codice di Gortina (Milan, 1997) 121.
8 E. Cantarella, ‘Greek law and the family’ in B. Rawson (ed.) A Companion to Families in the Greek 
and Roman Worlds (Malden MA, 2011) 331–45 at 342–3.
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legal analysis which shows that it is mistaken to speak of ‘rights’ for slaves in Gortyn; 
what we are dealing with are rules concerned with property which sometimes need to 
take into account complexities generated by the existence of slave unions or the de facto 
possessions of slaves. Part IV explains the rationale for the existence of slave unions 
from the point of view of the slaveowner, showing that we need not account for these 
relationships by postulating a benign attitude toward slaves by their masters. Like any 
other slave system, however, Gortyn’s involved a dynamic relationship between mas-
ters and slaves; part V argues that some of the legal rules are evidence for the need to 
accommodate the will of slaves to establish unions of their own choosing. Part VI sets 
the Gortynian rules in a broader context, and raises the likelihood that similar practices 
existed elsewhere in the Greek world.
I. Introduction
Some preliminary remarks are necessary before we scrutinise the relevant provisions 
in detail. First, we must brieﬂ y deal with a matter of terminology. Two terms are used 
for slaves in the Gortyn Code: dolos and woikeus. This has confounded many scholars, 
since (rationally speaking) modern legal thinking demands terminological consistency. 
Some have thought that the two terms denote two different statuses: dolos denoting a 
‘chattel’ slave of the sort found in Athens; woikeus, a helot-style ‘serf.’9 This simply 
does not work, for two reasons. First, it has long been recognised that these words are 
synonymous and interchangeable in terms of their usage in the Code. If we suppose 
that they refer to different statuses, various intractable problems arise.10 Besides, there 
is a good reason why two synonymous terms for ‘slave’ might appear in a single legal 
code. The Great Code did not spring into existence ex nihilo but compiled, redacted and 
organised many earlier rules that had been enacted piecemeal over a period of many 
years.11 Let us suppose the Gortynian terms dolos and woikeus were employed somewhat 
like doulos and oiketês in Attic, the two terms being synonyms for ‘slave’ and used in-
 9 Finley was right when he wrote in 1960 that ‘serfs appear everywhere’ in the historiography of Greek 
slavery (see Finley [n. 2] at 142). The picture has not changed in the intervening ﬁ fty years, and the 
terminology of serfdom still has a powerful hold on modern scholars. For recent criticisms, see N. 
Luraghi, ‘Helotic Slavery Reconsidered’ in A. Powell & S. Hodkinson (edd.) Sparta: Beyond the 
Mirage (London, 2002) 229–50 at 228–33.
10 Here is not the place to rehearse these arguments. They were ﬁ rst set out by H. Lipsius, Zum Recht 
von Gortyns. Abhandlungen der sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, phil.-hist. Kl. XXVII no. 11 
(Leipzig, 1909) 397–9, and endorsed by Finley (n. 2) 135–7. The fullest argument for this view is 
S. Link, ‘Dolos und Woikeus im Recht von Gortyn’ Dike 4 (2001) 87–112. The legal unity of these 
terms has been endorsed by several scholars, e. g. Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 120–1; Kristensen (n. 5) 73, idem, 
(n. 1) 147 n. 24; Davies, (n. 4) 315–6. Kristensen’s excellent study of Gortynian debt-bondage (n. 
5) demonstrates that legal status in Gortyn was less convoluted than has hitherto been recognised.
11 For the prehistory of the Code see Davies (n. 1); Kristensen (n. 1).
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terchangeably in everyday life.12 If some Gortynian rules employed dolos terminology, 
and others enacted at a different time used the term woikeus, any compilation of these 
individual rules (such as we have in the Great Code) would contain a mixture of both 
terms.13 Of course, the individuals who erected the Code could have smoothed-out the 
irregularities in language and stuck to a single standardised term. But we must remember 
that these were not modern legal draftsmen obsessed with terminological consistency. If 
it were perfectly evident to a Gortynian reader that dolos and woikeus meant the same 
thing (as an Athenian would conclude about any document blending the terminology 
of doulos and oiketes, e. g. Thuc. 3.73; Dem. 49.55–7; cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.11; Lys. 
7.16–17), there would have been no reason to standardise the terminology in this way. 
Choosing to be conservative, the redactor(s) of IC IV 72 retained – warts and all – the 
language of the earlier individual enactments, producing an inelegant but workable col-
lection of rules.14This explanation is preferable to supposing that dolos and woikeus are 
terms referring to different groups that at some point underwent some manner of legal 
coalescence, so that the rules for one could be applied to the other and vice versa.15
The second problem relates to the issue of helotic slavery in the Greek world. In 
the fourth century BCE, Plato and Aristotle drew attention to several slave systems that 
lay outside the norm. The most notable examples were the helots of Laconia and Mes-
senia, the slave populations of Crete, the Thessalian Penestai, and the Mariandynoi of 
Heraclea Pontica (Pl. Leg. 776c–d; Arist. Pol. 1264a32–6, 1269a37–b5, 1271b40–72a2, 
Arist. Fr. 586 [Rose]). In no instance do these classical writers mention a basic status 
difference between helotic slaves and slaves from other parts of the Greek world. In fact, 
their single criterion for grouping these systems together is the ethnic homogeneity of 
the slave populations, which according to Plato rendered them more liable to revolt (Pl. 
Leg. 777b–d). Modern scholars have largely ignored the fact that these writers described 
the helots and other helotic groups as slaves, and instead have latched on to the dubi-
12 Gagarin (n. 6) 22–3 seems to think (following LSJ) that oiketês means ‘domestic’ or ‘household’ 
slave, but this is incorrect: it is a general term for slaves (cf. its usage in Thuc. 8.40.2; Hyp. 3.22; 
see also K. Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425 [Cambridge, 2011] 513–8). That 
the two terms both refer to the same status does not rule out the possibility that they have different 
nuances, semantically speaking.
13 Cf. Kristensen (n. 1) 147.
14 Besides, the Attic orators refer to Athenian laws of slavery using different terminology: doulos (Ae-
schin. 1.15, 1.138, 1.139), oiketês (Hyp. 3.22; Dem. 47.72), andrapodon (Hyp. 3.15); it is entirely 
possible that the orators are mirroring the language of the inscribed enactments and that the Attic 
law code consolidated in the late ﬁ fth century utilised multiple terms for ‘slave’ as well. Given our 
knowledge of Athenian society, it is obvious that doulos, oiketês and andrapodon are all terms that 
can be used for the same status; but we utterly lack this sort of knowledge for Gortynian society. 
Were the tables turned in terms of the nature of our evidence, we might well be debating the exist-
ence of different ‘servile statuses’ in Attica on the basis of terminology.
15 This is a possibility suggested in a masterly essay by J.K. Davies, ‘Gortyn Within the Economy of 
Archaic and Classical Crete’ in E. Greco & M. Lombardo (edd.) La grande iscrizione di Gortyna 
(Athens, 2005) 153–74 at 161; the idea is greatly expanded by Gagarin (n. 6). The extrapolation of 
this theory by the latter scholar produces a very convoluted picture of Gortynian slave law.
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ous categorisation of these groups as lying ‘between free men and slaves’ by a scholar 
of the 2nd century CE. By shifting the focus from ethnic and organisational differences 
to a putative difference in legal status, modern scholarship has thus re-categorized the 
helots and, by extension, other helotic populations, removing them from mainstream 
discourse on slavery. The most common category to which these groups have been reas-
signed is serfdom, a status wherein individuals were bound to a certain plot of land and 
forced to render tribute or labour services to the landowner.16 For the historian of Crete, 
it is crucial to understand whether the categorisation of the helots as serfs is legitimate, 
since extrapolation from Sparta to Crete sets the general parameters for any detailed 
discussion on Cretan servile status.
There are three possible scenarios whereby helots might have been bound to a 
single klaros in a fashion analogous to serfdom. First, if the helot population was pub-
licly owned and shared out among the citizens to hold in usufruct, these helots would 
have been inalienable from the point of view of the private citizen. Belonging to the 
state, they would not have been the private citizens’ property to sell, and to all intents 
and purposes, this would have bound the helot to an individual’s klaros.17 The second 
possibility would be that the helots were privately owned but that some form of public 
restriction banned either their alienation altogether or at least their alienation separate 
from plots of land, which would have had much the same effect. The third is that the 
helots found themselves in a position legally analogous to serfs, i. e. that neither state, 
nor institution, nor individual, exercised the rights of ownership over them, but that 
they were held in bondage through other legal means (namely the rendering of tribute 
or labour services paired with restriction of movement). Were any of these scenarios 
true, we might be forgiven for using the terminology of serfdom to describe helotic 
forms of slavery. 
There are insurmountable problems with all three scenarios. The idea that helots were 
public property is a late development of the Hellenistic period and Sparta’s revolution;18 
during the Classical period it is clear that they were private property.19 A law of Sparta 
banned sale of helots ‘beyond the borders’, but this ipso facto demonstrates that helots 
could be bought and sold inside Spartan territory.20 Similar rules are known for the Pe-
16 G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London, 1981) 147–55 pro-
vides the best discussion of the category.
17 This is the view of P.A. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, 1300–362 BC (London, 
1979) 164–5; ‘Serfdom in Classical Greece’ in L. Archer (ed.) Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree 
Labour (London, 1988) 33–41; ‘Raising Hell? The Helot Mirage – a personal re-view’ in N. Lur-
aghi & S. Alcock (edd.) Helots and their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, 
Structures (Cambridge MA & London, 2003) 12–30, who holds that the helots were ‘state serfs’, an 
idea developed by de Ste. Croix (n. 16).
18 We ﬁ nd this notion in the late accounts of Strabo (8.5.4) and Pausanias (3.20.6). 
19 See J. Ducat, Les Hilotes. BCH Suppl. 20 (Athens, 1990) 19–29; Luraghi (n. 9) 228–33.
20 The key passage is Ephorus FGrH 70 F 117: the ancestors of the helots ‘???????? ??????? ??? 
??????? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ???’ ?????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ???????.’ 
As Luraghi (n. 9) 228-9 rightly notes, ‘only preconceived ideas about helotry can explain how some 
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nestai of Thessaly and the Mariandynoi of Heraclea Pontica.21 In other words, helotage 
was a system of private slavery; one cannot simply assert that helotage was a form of 
serfdom and then extrapolate this model to other helotic systems such as those found 
on Crete. There is no evidence that Greek systems of servitude during the Archaic and 
Classical periods ever involved individuals being legally bound to a speciﬁ c plot of land, 
or of slaves being inalienable22, and only by extrapolating imaginary rules about slaves 
being ‘bound to the soil’ can we suppose that anything of this sort ever existed in Crete.23 
On the contrary, the Gortynian laws make it clear that slaves could be privately sold.24 
It is therefore a mistake to categorise the helots – and by extension, other helotic 
groups – as serfs. It is also a mistake to view helotic slavery as a rigid category redu-
plicating the Spartan model. Plato and Aristotle did not envisage these systems in such 
a manner, only loosely grouping them together; and as Aristotle noted, very different 
conditions pertained for the slave populations of Crete and Sparta (Pol. 1269a37–b5, 
scholars have been able to interpret this clause as if it meant that it was forbidden to sell helots 
altogether. A quick look at the text shows that, in order to convey that meaning, it would have been 
enough to conclude the sentence with ??????, without mentioning the borders.’
21 S. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta (London, 2000) 118–19 has found Ephorus’ 
statement inconclusive; he doubts the explicit ban on selling Mariandynoi beyond the national fron-
tiers (Poseidonios FGrHist 87 F 8) as an appropriate parallel, and believes that little factual informa-
tion can be derived from the latter passage due to its preoccupation with an obviously apocryphal 
‘contract of servitude.’ It makes more sense, however, to view the ‘contract’ as an aetiological tale 
to explain an historical ban on external sale; precisely the same thing can be seen in relation to the 
Penestai in Archemachos FGrHist 424 F 1. Slaves in some helotic systems could not, therefore, be 
sold abroad; but this is profoundly different from them being legally bound to a speciﬁ c plot of land; 
they could potentially be dispersed throughout Messenia and Lakonia, Thessaly and the Heraclean 
chora respectively, none of these regions inconsiderable in extent.
22 It is hard to imagine a rationale as to why slaves might ever have been altogether inalienable in 
any Greek society; it is certainly not the case that such a scenario could be an ossiﬁ ed relic of early 
Greek history, for slaves are freely alienable in Homeric epic (see E.M. Harris, ‘Omero, Esiodo e le 
“origini” della schiavitù greca’ in Di Nardo, A. & G.A. Lucchetta (edd.) Nuove e antiche schiavitù 
[Pescara 2012] 32–52). The notion of inalienability, it seems to me, is a by-product of the classiﬁ ca-
tion of helotic slavery in terms of serfdom.
23 Gagarin (n. 6) 25–6 suggests that woikeis were ‘attached to the land’ but provides no evidence to 
corroborate this claim. He then rightly notes that the evidence points to woikeis being alienable (see 
the next note), but tries to interpret this in the context of land sales. Cf. R.F. Willetts, Aristocratic 
Society in Ancient Crete (London, 1955) 47. 
24 IC IV 72 VII 10–15 relates that doloi are sold in the agora. IC IV 41 IV 5–17 places a ban on selling 
a woikeus who has run away from his owner and taken shelter in a temple. This is obviously not a 
general interdiction on selling woikeis but is designed to protect the property interests of the master 
of the runaway slave, i. e. by preventing anyone at hand from proﬁ ting by selling another person’s 
‘lost property.’ If woikeis were generally inalienable, then there would have been no need to create 
this rule; rather, the rule implies that woikeis were normally able to be sold (Cf. Link [n. 3] 33–4; 
Davies [n. 4] 316). This is mirrored by similar legislation in IC IV 72 I 39–55, where the concern 
seems to lie with protecting and recovering private property (i. e. slaves). I should state that none 
of this necessarily implies that slaves were sold frequently, only that the option existed for owners 
(cf. Luraghi [n. 9] 233).
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1272b17–20). The only quality that made helots similar to Cretan slaves or Thessalian 
Penestai was that in all three regions the slaves spoke a single tongue.25 Beyond that 
single unifying criterion, we should expect considerable diversity: not only was Cretan 
slavery different from Spartan helotage; we should expect considerable diversity within 
Crete itself. Gortyn represents one of over sixty classical Cretan poleis, and recent work 
has emphasised that beyond several widely shared institutions, Cretan poleis were struc-
turally quite diverse.26 A patchwork of slave populations stretched across the island, and 
the Gortynian laws provide us valuable insights into one such group. For the purposes 
of this study, then, we shall follow the now well-established position that in Gortynian 
law, dolos and woikeus equate to the same status, namely slave status, and avoid the 
problematic connotations that inevitably arise once one begins to use the terminology 
of serfdom.27
II. Slave Marriages: A Comparative Perspective
Why, then, do modern scholars often agree that in Gortyn, slaves enjoyed special rights28 
to marry and own property? This is in part due to terminology, in part due to ambiguity 
in the language of the Code, and in part due to the fact that the relationships envisaged 
in the Code (servile marriages between slaves of different owners, and between slaves 
25 See N. Luraghi, ‘The Helots: comparative approaches, ancient and modern’ in S. Hodkinson (ed.) 
Sparta: Comparative Approaches (Swansea, 2009) 261–304 at 265. 
26 See P. Perlman, ‘One Hundred-Citied Crete and the “Cretan Politeia”’ Classical Philology 87 (1992) 
193–205, but this should be read with the qualiﬁ cations of A. Chaniotis, ‘The Great Inscription, 
Its Political and Social Institutions and the Common Institutions of the Cretans’ in E. Greco & M. 
Lombardo (edd.) La grande inscrizione di Gortyna (Athens, 2005) 175–94. 
27 It is common to view Gortynian slavery as a hybrid of helotic slavery and esclavage marchandise. 
This is a mistaken assumption; ﬁ rst, as we have seen, dolos and woikeus mean the same thing; the 
terms do not represent groups of ‘chattel slaves’ and ‘serfs.’ Secondly, it is not the case that one 
was ‘bound to the soil’ and the other alienable; even were we to believe that doloi and woikeis were 
different groups, both could have been sold (cf. n. 24). Thirdly, alienability of slaves is a feature of 
helotic slavery as well as esclavage marchandise, and need not imply links to overseas markets. 
28 I should clarify what I mean by rights. Some scholars claim that the Greeks had no concept of rights, 
but this is erroneous – see M.H. Hansen, ‘The ancient Athenian and the modern liberal view of liberty 
as a democratic ideal’ in J. Ober & C. Hendrick (edd.) D?mokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, 
Ancient and Modern (Princeton, 1996) 91–104, who shows that in Athens the concept of rights was 
implicitly recognised. See also D. Cohen, ‘Democracy and individual rights in Athens’ Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 114 (1997) 27–44. For the Gor-
tynian case, the scholars cited in notes 3–6 above sometimes seem to treat the idea of slave ‘rights’ 
as a privilege that could be enforced against an unwilling master. A ‘right to marry’ thus amounts to 
the privilege of choosing a spouse without requiring the permission of one’s own or one’s would-be 
spouse’s owner; a ‘right to own property’ amounts to the capacity to own property that cannot be 
conﬁ scated by one’s owner. At other times, these authors use the term ‘rights’ ambiguously; implicit, 
though, is the assumption that slaves could seek legal redress for infringement of their privileges.
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and free persons) are difﬁ cult to parallel elsewhere in Greece, and thus seem – if not 
unique – at least highly peculiar. Categorisation in terms of serfdom has also contributed 
to this notion. Let us look at each in turn.
1. Terminology. The words used to describe servile marriage in the Code are opuien 
for men and the middle opuiesthai for women (IC IV 72 III 54–5; IV 4, 19; VII 1). These 
are precisely the same words used to denote the normal marriage relationship between 
free persons (for example, IC IV 72 III 19–20; VII 16, 20–1, 23, 26, 30, 35, 43, 46, 
47, 52, 54). Some scholars believe that the identical vocabulary reﬂ ects a more-or-less 
identical legal arrangement.29
2. The Code is often a puzzling text. It was written for readers with a great deal of 
contextual knowledge about Gortynian society, not for modern scholars, who, as outsiders 
to this legal culture, lack any of the basic contextual knowledge that those responsible for 
the erection of the inscription assumed readers would possess.30 What seems to us like a 
terse and unnecessarily opaque statement in the Code probably made perfect sense to a 
Gortynian. Lacking this insider knowledge, some statements can bear multiple possible 
interpretations in the eyes of the modern scholar. Prima facie, several statements in the 
Code look like evidence for slave rights, such as the apparent right of slaves to hold on 
to property during the division of an inheritance (IC IV 72 IV 31–43), or the apparent 
right of a slave woman to take away personal property in the event of a divorce (IC IV 
72 III 40–4). But we must remember that there is a great deal of contextual information 
not committed to stone in Gortyn’s laws, and what seems at ﬁ rst glance unambiguous 
may upon closer inspection depend upon contextual information that is now lost. There 
are better ways of explaining these aforementioned provisions, as we shall see.
3. The fact that the Code refers to marriages between slaves of two different owners 
(IC IV 72 III 52–IV 8) or between slaves and free persons (IC IV 72 VI 56–VII 10) is 
downright peculiar, and hard to parallel elsewhere in Greece, where the better known 
pieces of our (albeit slender) body of sources refer only to unions between slaves of the 
same owner. Understandably, some scholars have thought the Gortynian arrangements 
to be unique to that community.31
29 H. Van Effenterre & F. Ruzé, Nomima. Recueil d’inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l’archaïsme 
Grec. II (Rome, 1995) 130; Lévy (n. 3) 39–40; Gagarin (n. 6) 23; Cantarella (n. 8) 342–3 ‘this rule 
(to our knowledge the only one of its kind in the ancient world) certainly alludes to a marriage, and 
not a de facto union: the verb used is opuein, the same verb used for marriage between free persons’ 
(…) ‘[t]he Gortyn code also regulated the sexual relations between slaves owned by different mas-
ters, and subsumed them in the legal institute of marriage (as the use of the verb opuein also in this 
case seems to demonstrate).’
30 Chaniotis (n. 26) 178 perceptively writes ‘[t]he Law Code does not deﬁ ne any of the social, economic, 
legal and political institutions, for which norms are introduced, modiﬁ ed, or just written down; it 
presupposes the understanding of all these institutions, and this is why the interpretation of terms 
and clauses is still a matter of controversy.’
31 Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 122 n. 106 sees the Gortynian laws as rather unusual compared to other poleis; see also 
Cantarella (n. 8) 343, who is struck by the ‘absolute originality of these provisions.’
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4. The very fact that scholars have long thought of helotic systems in terms of serf-
dom has fostered the idea that these systems differed fundamentally in terms of legal 
status from the standard (Attic) model of slavery. Comparisons with serfdom may, if 
conducted carefully, prove illuminating,32 but in a legal sense this terminology is very 
misleading. Once one labels a population as ‘serfs’, one starts to look for special legal 
rights that placed this population in a better position than slaves. The argument is es-
sentially based on a false premise: if helots were serfs, and serfs have rights, then helots 
(and other helotic populations) must have had rights as well. The act of categorisation 
pre-emptively supplies these populations with rights, prejudicing the historian’s reading 
of the evidence so that he or she will look for rights, and interpret certain arrangements 
in such a fashion to ﬁ t neatly into the prefabricated ‘box’ of serfdom.
Scholars often loosely refer to these ‘rights’ without speciﬁ cally stating what they 
might amount to. Yet it does not require much thought to imagine the myriad problems 
that might arise if we assume that Gortynian slaves possessed such putative rights. Could 
they use such rights to thwart the designs of their masters? For example, we have seen 
that in Gortyn, slaves were an alienable commodity.33 Could a slave appeal to his right 
to remain with his slave wife in a formal marriage as a way of preventing his master 
from selling him? And what do we mean by claiming that a Gortynian slave had a right 
to marry? Could a slave form a marital relationship in spite of the objections of his 
owner? Or could a slave be at the same time the property of his owner and yet possess 
rights to own his own property that could not be interfered with by his master? If this 
is so, what happened to the slave’s property when he was sold? Furthermore, if we as-
sume that slaves had marital and proprietary rights in Gortyn, the internal evidence of 
the Code becomes strangely inconsistent. Parts of the Code make it clear that masters 
could sell their slaves and that the children of two slaves always belonged to a master, 
not to the slaves themselves. This does not dovetail comfortably with the view that, 
whilst remaining under his power, a slave could resist his master in various formal ways 
by appealing to his so-called ‘rights.’ And does such a permissive picture of slavery ﬁ t 
with what we know of the militaristic character of Gortynian society?34 Such hypotheti-
cal scenarios seem instinctively problematic and beg for a more rational explanation.35
What is needed is a reconsideration of these texts in the light of a comparative 
overview of servile unions, taking into consideration both ancient and modern exempla. 
If one examines the evidence against such a backdrop, it will be possible to determine 
whether the servile unions described therein were historically unusual, or instead resem-
32 A salutatory example is S. Hodkinson, ‘Spartiates, helots and the direction of the agrarian economy: 
toward an understanding of Helotage in comparative perspective’ in E. Dal Lago & C. Katsari (edd.) 
Slave Systems, Ancient and Modern (Cambridge, 2008) 285–320.
33 See note 24 above.
34 See H-J. Gehrke, ‘Gewalt und Gesetz. Die soziale und politische Ordnung Kretas in der archaischen 
und klassischen Zeit’ Klio 79 (1997) 23–68.
35 See the perceptive comments on Gortyn by O. Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge MA, 
1982) 185 and p. 426 n. 49.
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bled those of other places and periods in their fundamental legal features. Three points 
in particular need to be made at the outset, which will arm us against hasty assumptions 
when we read Gortyn’s rules dealing with slave unions.
A. The ﬁ rst point relates to property. In many slave systems, slaves have been able to 
possess and manage property, run their own businesses, create contracts, and accumulate 
wealth. At ﬁ rst glance, slaves in such situations seem to use and dispose of property in 
the same manner as free persons. However, a closer look at the legal background to these 
practices reveals that the slave’s owner has generally granted the slave this latitude as a 
de facto concession; legal title to the property held by the slave, however, always rests 
with the slave’s owner.36 A few examples should sufﬁ ce to illustrate this relationship. 
The most familiar is peculium in Roman law, in which a slave was able to manage a 
fund, run his own business, and establish contracts, but dominium over this property 
remained in the hands of the slaveholder.37 A very similar situation prevailed in Classi-
cal Attica. Good evidence for this can be found in an inscription listing the conﬁ scated 
goods of Adeimantus, who was accused of vandalising the herms in 415 BCE. Among 
the goods of this individual are listed several slaves, among them a leather worker 
named Aristarchus (IG i³ 426.14). A few lines later, we ﬁ nd a list of property which 
had ‘belonged’ to Aristarchus included among the conﬁ scated goods of his owner (IG i³ 
426.24–39). Evidently, this slave had been living apart from Adeimantus and more-or-
less running his own affairs, but the property he possessed legally belonged to his master 
and was conﬁ scated alongside Aristarchus himself when Adeimantus was condemned 
(Cf. Hyp. Ath. passim). This was not a practice restricted to the ‘classical’ slave systems 
of Greece and Rome. If we peer into the heart of the Persian Empire during the same 
historical period, we may observe the very same thing, that is, slaves ‘working on their 
own time’, paying a rent to their Babylonian masters, but whose possessions belonged 
to their owners and were granted de facto but not held de iure. Several of these slaves 
became wealthy and powerful, but it is clear that their masters enjoyed full legal rights 
over both them and their possessions.38 The same legal relationship existed two thou-
sand years later, when Frederick Douglass lived apart from his owner in the Baltimore 
shipyards and lamented his lack of legal rights to all of his earnings.39 My basic point is 
that we should look very carefully at the Gortynian texts to establish whether the legal 
36 For the concept of ownership in comparative perspective, see A.M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in A.G. 
Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford 1961) 107–147. E.M. Harris, ‘Response to G. 
Thür’ in E.M. Harris & G. Thür (edd.) Symposion 2007: Akten der Gesellschaft für griechische und 
hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna 2009) 189–202 shows that the Greeks had a clear concept 
of ownership that can be distinguished from possession. See also A. Kränzlein, Eigentum und Besitz 
im griechischen Recht (Berlin, 1963).
37 For peculium, see W.W. Buckland, (1908) The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 187–206.
38 For peculium in Babylonian law, see M.A. Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia from Nabopolassar to 
Alexander the Great (626–331 BC). Revised edition. (Dekalb IL, 1984) 320–97. 
39 See the Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass [1845] in H.L. Gates, The Classic Slave Narra-
tives (New York, 1987) 414–5. For a broader comparative study of peculium see Patterson (n. 35) 
182–6.
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relationship between slaves and property was similar to the aforementioned examples, 
or whether they enjoyed formal rights of ownership.
B. The second point relates to marriage, and in particular to unions established 
outside the holdings of a single slaveowner. We have noted that in Gortyn slaves could 
marry the slaves of other owners or free persons. Are such concessions necessarily 
formal in legal terms, or historically unusual? The comparativist must answer ‘no’ on 
both counts. In the American South, many servile unions were established between 
slaves of different owners, and between slaves and free persons. For example, in the 
slave narrative of Mary Prince we learn that she was the child of slaves belonging to 
different owners; her father was owned by a certain Mr. Trimmingham, her mother by 
a Mr. Myners.40 The slave Harriet Jacobs relates in her narrative how she fell in love 
with a free man and planned to marry him, but was prevented by her infatuated master.41 
In the US South, such unions did not possess a legal character. One must, nonetheless, 
note the legal ramiﬁ cations of these unions. Let us take as a paradigm case the circum-
stance of a master owning a male and a female slave, with both slaves forming a union; 
it is obvious that any children produced from that union would belong to the couple’s 
master, as would any property accumulated by the couple over which they have de facto 
possession. Such simple scenarios pose no legal complications. But let us imagine that 
a master owns a male slave who falls in love with the female slave of another owner. 
Provided that both masters consent to the establishment of the union, the couple can 
‘marry.’ If they have a child, this raises a legal problem: to which slaveowner does the 
child belong? Or suppose that the couple accumulate possessions over time. If one of 
them dies or the union for some reason ends, who owns the property? Potentially, both 
slaveowners have a stake in the goods. Or consider a union between a free person and 
a slave. Not only does this raise the same problems over property as noted in a union 
between slaves of different owners, but it also poses a problem in terms of the status 
of children: do they obtain the status of the free parent, or the slave? Such problems 
40 The History of Mary Prince: A West Indian Slave [1831], in Gates (n. 39) 249–321, at 253. For such 
arrangements, see E. West, Chains of Love: Slave Couples in Antebellum South Carolina (Urbana 
& Chicago, 2004). Scholars working on the Gortyn Code, perhaps unaware of such parallels, have 
postulated various unlikely scenarios whereby a slave woman would become the property of her 
spouse’s master or that some sort of loan could be worked out (see Willetts [n. 1] 15, cautiously 
followed by Gagarin [n. 6] 23 n. 28). This is all rather unnecessary; for the rationale and dynamics 
of out-of-household servile unions, see sections IV and V, below.
41 Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl [1861], in Gates (n. 38) 437–668, at 481–7. For further examples, 
see E. West, ‘“She is dissatisﬁ ed with her present condition”: requests for voluntary enslavement 
in the antebellum American south’ Slavery & Abolition 28.3 (2007) 329–50 at 337–42. See also I. 
Berlin, Slaves Without Masters. The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York, 1971) 269. 
Scholars who believe in the special privileges of Cretan slaves (e. g. Willetts [n. 1] 15; Garlan [n. 
3] 100) sometimes appeal to Arist. Pol. 1264a: ??????? ??? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????? 
????? ?????????? ?? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. This is not as surprising as it may at ﬁ rst 
appear; the basic institutions of family, church, and so on were extended to slaves in the antebellum 
US, and nobody would consider this evidence for a mild and permissive form of slavery.
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occur in many slave systems. A glance at ancient Near Eastern law may be helpful in 
illustrating some possible solutions.
One familiar example comes from the Hebrew Bible, Exodus 21:1–11, which de-
scribes a form of indenture which applied only to Hebrews and not to foreigners. The 
term of the Hebrew’s service to his master was limited to six years (Ex. 21:2); he was 
therefore not a slave but an indentured servant. If, during his term of service, he married 
one of his master’s slave women and had children, the children were to be the property 
of the master (Ex. 21:4). However, if he wished to remain with his ‘wife’ and children 
after his six-year term, he could choose to become the slave of his master by undergoing 
a special ceremony (Ex. 21:5–6). Here, a possible conﬂ ict of interest is elucidated: in 
a mixed-status marriage between a free (although indentured) man and a slave woman, 
what status are the children to have? The law clariﬁ es the situation: they belong to the 
woman’s master. Older laws in the cuneiform tradition42 show a similar concern to clarify 
possible ambiguities that might arise from servile unions, particularly with regard to 
slaves kept as concubines, who enjoy certain legal protections after bearing children to 
their masters.43 A most revealing text for the purposes of comparison can be found in 
the laws of Hammurabi (LH 176a):
And if either a slave of the palace or a slave of a commoner marries a woman of the 
aw?lu-class44, and when he marries her she enters the house of the slave of the palace or 
of the slave of the commoner together with the dowry brought from her father’s house, 
and subsequent to the time that they move in together they establish a household and 
accumulate possessions, after which either the slave of the palace or the slave of the 
commoner should go to his fate – the woman of the aw?lu-class shall take her dowry; 
furthermore, they shall divide into two parts everything that her husband and she ac-
cumulated subsequent to the time that they moved in together, and the slave’s owner 
shall take half and the woman of the aw?lu-class shall take half for her children.45
The lesson these examples provide is that one should not leap to the hasty conclusion that 
simply because a law code mentions marriages or property of slaves, it must be concerned 
42 Translations and references to cuneiform law follow M. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia 
and Asia Minor (Atlanta GA, 1995).
43 Here is not the place to consider these in detail, but the relevant texts are as follows: LU 4 & 5; LL 
23a & 25; LH 119, 144, 146, 147, 170, 171, 175, 176a. Also compare LE 31 on the rape of a slave 
to IC IV 72 II 5–16.
44 The word aw?lu denotes a free citizen: see the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, s. v. am?lu, aw?lu 3 
(‘free man.’).
45 Beyond the evidence of Near Eastern ‘law codes’, the applicability of which to real cases is debated, 
we possess concrete case documents from the same period as the Gortyn Code which show both 
unions between slaves of different owners and between slaves and free persons. On these documents, 
see the invaluable discussion of Dandamaev (n. 38) 409–414. In particular, an Aramaic document 
from Elephantine dated 449 BCE gives extensive detail on the terms of a marriage between a free 
man and a slave woman, stipulating that children of the union will belong to the woman’s owner. 
See B. Porten & H.Z. Szubin, ‘The status of the handmaiden Tamet: a new interpretation of Kraeling 
2 (TAD B3.3)’ Israel Law Review 29 (1995) 43–64.
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with validating or protecting slave ‘rights’ of marriage or ownership. The rules may well 
be aimed at clarifying the property rights of other interested parties. We will consider 
the rationale behind the establishment of these complex servile unions later in the essay.
C. The ﬁ nal point relates to the terminology of marriage. We have noted that the 
vocabulary of marriage in the Code is the same for slaves and free persons. Does this 
mean we are dealing with the same legal relationship? A glance cross-culturally sug-
gests otherwise. For example, in America in 1849 a man named Joseph Coates attempted 
to separate two of his slaves who were ‘married’, Ednoull and Sally. As it happened, 
Ednoull was able to thwart his owner’s plans by threatening suicide, which would have 
deprived Coates of a valuable worker. What is clear is that despite being ‘married’ to 
Sally and referring to their relationship using the same vocabulary as his master would 
have used to refer to his marriage, Ednoull could not legally resist his master’s powers 
of ownership, and had to ﬁ nd other ways to keep his relationship with Sally intact.46 In 
the ancient world, a similar use of language can be observed. In Rome, slave contubernia 
were regularly referred to using the vocabulary of free unions, with no alteration to their 
informal legal character.47 The two Near Eastern examples just mentioned further illus-
trate this principle. The Hebrew of Exodus uses the verb ??? (b??al) which simply means 
‘marry’ and is used in non-servile contexts, although it is a rarer term for marriage than 
??? (??ra?) ‘betroth.’ Likewise, the slave wife is referred to by the normal word for wife, 
??? (išš?h). The Akkadian text of Hammurabi’s laws employs the same verb (a??zum) 
for slave marriages as it does for marriages between free persons (cf. LH 176a with LH 
148, 162, 163 &c). There is no a priori reason, therefore, to suppose that the identical 
use of vocabulary for free and slave marriages in Gortyn need imply legal equivalency.
III. Gortynian Texts on Slave Unions
With these points in mind, we may now proceed to analyse the relevant portions of 
Gortyn’s legislation. I have assigned the letters A–E to ﬁ ve portions of the Code.
Text A: IC IV 72 III 52–IV 23
?? ?? ?????? ??- and if a woikea should bear a child while??? ?????????, ????????? separated, (they) are to bring it to the owner?õ? ?????? ?õ ??????, ?? ?- of the man who married her in the presence????, ???? ???????? ? ?[?]õ?. of two witnesses. ?? ?? ?? ?? ????????, ??? ?õ? And if he do not receive?????? ???? ?? ?????? ?õ? ?- it, the child shall be in the power?? ???????. ?? ?? ?õ? ???õ? ??- of the owner of the woikea; but if??? ???????? ??? ?õ ??????- she should marry the same man again
õ, ?? ??????? ??? ?õ? ?????? before the end of the year, the child shall
46 See W. Johnson, Soul by Soul. Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge MA, 1999) 34–5.
47 See B. Rawson, ‘Concubinage and other de facto marriages’ TAPhA 104 (1974) 279–305.
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???? ?õ? ?õ ???????. ??????- be in the power of the owner of the????? ???? ??? ?????????- woikeus, and the one who brought it?? ??? ??? ?????????. vac. ?- and the witnesses shall have preference??? ????????’ ?? ???????? in the oath. If a separated woman??????? ???? ????????? ????- should expose her child before? ?? ?????????, ???????? ?- presenting it as is written, if she is con-?? ?????????? ?????????? victed, she shall pay, for a free child, ﬁ fty????e'????, ???? ????? ??? ?- staters, for a dolos, twenty-ﬁ ve. And if?????, ?? ?? ?????e'?. o\? ?? ?? ?- the man should have no house to which? ’?[?] ? ? ? ’???? ???? ????????- she shall bring it or she do not see him,?, ? ????? ?? ??e'?, ?? {??} ????- there is to be no penalty if she should??? ?? ???????, ?????? ????. expose the child. If a woikea who is
vac. ?? ??????? ??? ????? ????- unmarried should conceive and bear, the?? ?? ?????????, ??? ?õ? ?õ child shall be in the power of the owner?????? ?????? ???? ?? ?- of her father; but in case the father?????? ?? ?’ ? ????? ?? ????, ?- should not be living, it shall be in the?? ???? ?õ? ??????õ? ???- power of the owners of her brothers.???? ????. 
This text provides good evidence that slaves could form unions with the slaves of other 
owners, and employs the same terminology that we ﬁ nd used for free marriages. At ﬁ rst 
glance, this appears to show a signiﬁ cant concession to slaves, namely the right to marry 
slaves from other households. But does this text really deal in terms of rights? Nowhere 
is there a substantive rule granting slaves a right to marry whomsoever they wish, nor 
any procedure to maintain such a marriage in the face of opposition by their owner. In 
fact, most of the text is concerned with identifying which party is to gain ownership of 
the slave couple’s child in a variety of scenarios. This conforms to the model outlined 
above, where a union between slaves belonging to different owners creates a potential 
ambiguity in terms of the ownership of children: does the child belong to the owner 
of the male slave, or the owner of the female slave? The Gortynian rules answer this 
query by showing that ownership of the child depends on the status of the marriage. If 
the marriage is dissolved when the child is born, the child is to be presented to the ex-
husband’s owner. If he does not want the child, then the woman’s owner is next in line 
to gain rights over the child. However, if the marriage is re-established within a year, 
the child goes to the man’s owner. If the child is born outside the slave marriage, then it 
goes to the owner of the female slave’s father, or, if he is no longer living, to the owner 
of her brothers. We can draw two important conclusions from this text. First, the slave 
has no right to his or her child; the law is clear that in any of these scenarios the child 
will belong to a slaveholder. Secondly, the marriage is not entirely informal in legal 
terms, because the nature of the relationship between the couple affects the property 
rights of their owners. In the event of separation of the couple, or of the female slave 
falling pregnant in a casual relationship, her owner can potentially gain rights over the 
child, whereas in a normal marriage scenario the male slave’s owner has ﬁ rst call when 
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it comes to taking possession of the child. This is interesting, but it certainly does not 
confer any ‘rights’ on the male or female slave. So far, the Gortynian material does not 
diverge from our cross-cultural model of the slave union outlined above. Our next text 
shows that slaves could also be married to free persons, and that if a male slave married a 
free woman and lived with her, their children were to be free and could inherit property.
Text B: IC IV 72 VI 56–VII 10
[------- ?? ?’ ? ?õ??? (If the dolos) goes to a free woman??? ??? ????????? ????? ??????, and marries her, their children shall???????’ ???? ?? ?????. ?? ?? ?’ be free; but if the free woman goes? ???????? ??? ??? ?õ???, ?õ?’ ??- to the dolos, their children shall?? ?? ?????. palmula ?? ?? ?’ ?? ??? ???- be doloi. And if free and dolos?? ?????? ???????? ??? ?õ?? children should be born of the????? ???????, e\ ?’ ???????? ? same mother, in a case where the?????, ?? ?’ e\? ???????, ???? ???- mother dies, if there is property, the??????? ????. ?? ?’ ????????? free children are to have it; but if ?? ???????, ????? ?????????- there should be no free children born of???? ?????e'???. her, the heirs are to take it over.
Once again, however, there is no mention of slaves having a right to marry whomsoever 
they choose; the law only envisages the possibility of a union between a free person 
and a slave, a scenario we have seen in other slave systems. The best explanation for 
this rule is that it clariﬁ es the status of children to slaveholders, that is, whether or not 
they are to gain ownership of a child of a mixed-status union. If the slave ‘goes to’ (i. e. 
dwells with) the free woman, the children are to be free and thus beyond the reach of the 
owner. If the free woman moves in with the slave, the owner of the slave gains property 
rights over the children. The possibility is envisaged that the same woman might bear 
free and slave children, perhaps because the couple have changed residence or perhaps 
because the father has been manumitted. In either scenario, if there is property left to be 
inherited, the free children gain it, and by implication, the slave children gain nothing. 
This rule further conforms to our standard model of servile unions, and once again is 
concerned with clarifying the property rights of free persons, not slaves.
Our next text is crucial to the notion that slaves possessed proprietary rights in 
Gortyn; to the casual observer, it looks like a speciﬁ c statement that slaves could own 
property and enforce their rights to it in court.
Text C: IC IV 72 III 40–44
?? ?-? ??????? ?????? ????e'? ??õ If a woikea be separated from a woikeus? ???????????, ?? ?? ????- while he is alive or in case of his death, she is? ????? ???? ?’ ?? ?? ?????, ???- to have her own property; but if she should???? ????. carry away anything else, that becomes a matter
  for trial. 
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According to several scholars, this amounts to unambiguous evidence that slaves could 
own property in Gortyn.48 But it is not necessary to read the rule this way. It makes best 
sense to understand this rule in the scenario of a union between slaves of different own-
ers. The legal interests of these owners with regard to the jointly possessed property of 
the slave couple have become enmeshed, because the property has been accumulated 
over time and has become intermingled; when the union ends, the property must be 
fairly divided between the relevant parties (i. e. the slaveowners).49 The process of divi-
sion is modelled to a certain extent on Gortyn’s rules for divorce between free persons 
(IC IV 72 II 45–III 16); but the function of this law seems to be comparable to the one 
mentioned above in Hammurabi’s Code, i. e. to split the property between its legal (free) 
owners.50 One might object that the sense of the Greek is unambiguous: the female slave 
is to have that which is hers. I quite agree. But I do not dispute what the Greek here 
says, but rather what it means. Again, we must remember that this text is meant to be 
read in a particular social context. Gortyn’s rules are in no way garrulous; they seldom 
go into detail deﬁ ning terms or giving long-winded, pedantic instructions of the sort 
that can be found in modern legal systems.51 If it were self-evident to a Gortynian that 
this rule should be read in the context of a union between slaves of different owners, 
then there would have been no need to state that it applied to this sort of union in so 
many words. Text A provides a most apposite parallel for this interpretation. This text 
does not state explicitly at the outset that the rule applies to marriages between slaves 
of different owners. Nevertheless, as the rules unfold it becomes clear that the couple 
must belong to different owners, and I would argue that text C must be read in the same 
fashion. Rather than any evidence for slave rights, this text is a good example of how 
peculiar a written rule may appear once the social context in which it was designed to 
be understood is lost.52
48 E. g. Willetts (n. 1) 49; Gagarin (n. 6) 26 ‘there is no doubt that a woikeus could own property.’ 
Gagarin does, however, limit this to moveable property. Cf. Davies (n. 4) 316.
49 Cf. Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 124 ‘Anche i beni che la schiava porta con sé restano di proprietà del suo padrone, 
e non si confondono con il patrimonio del padrone di suo marito.’
50 As convincingly demonstrated by Link (n. 3) 34–5 and endorsed by Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 124, who rightly 
observes ‘[n]on si vede quindi come si possa parlare di un diritto, se esso non è tutelabile giudiziari-
amente.’ Cf. Link (n. 3) 39–40. Cf. Van Effenterre & Ruzé (n. 29) 114.
51 For a good demonstration of this, see E.M. Harris, ‘What are the laws of Athens about? Substance 
and Procedure in Athenian Statutes’ DIKE 12 (2011) 5–67 with appendix 4. The tedious detail of 
modern deﬁ nitions is often not aimed at helping or informing individuals in how to act in a given 
scenario, but in removing possible avenues of litigious attack by creative lawyers. Needless to say, 
a similar rationale behind deﬁ nitions cannot be posited for ancient Greek law, where deﬁ nitions 
are used when meanings are not self-evident, or require precise wording, but are otherwise omitted 
(Harris, at 33–9).
52 The same principle must apply to ﬁ nes. Several scholars have supposed that when the Code refers 
to the offences of slaves requiring ﬁ nes, the slaves must pay them themselves from their own money 
or that slaves received ﬁ nes for offences perpetrated against them (Davies [n. 4] 316; idem, [n. 15] 
161; Gagarin [n. 6] 26). Admittedly, the Code is hardly probative on this point, merely stating the 
size of the ﬁ ne. However, the provisions in IC IV 47 make it clear that the slave had no right to the 
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Text D is more enigmatic. Unlike the previous texts, it does not deal with a situation 
where the slave is in a complex marital situation, but with a single slave’s possessions. 
It relates to a division of property after the head of a household has died:
Text D: IC IV 72 IV 23–43
??? ?????? ?õ? The father shall be in control of the?????? ??? ?õ? ???????? ?- children and the division of the property??????? ???? ??? ??????? and the mother of her own property. So??? ??? ?????? ?õ? ?õ? ??- long as they are living there is no ne-??? ????????. ?? ?? ??????, cessity to make a division; but if anyone ?? ????????? ???? ???e'- should be ﬁ ned, the one ﬁ ned shall have????? ?? ?? ??? ???????, ????- his share apportioned to him as is writ- ???????? ?õ? ???????? ?- ten. And in case (the father) should die,? ????????. e\ ?? ?’ ???????? ???, the city houses and whatever there is in
’?????? ??? ???? ?? ???? ??- the houses in which a woikeus living in the?? ?’ ?? ???? ’?????? ??e'? ??- country does not reside, and the cattle,? ?? ?? ??????? ?? ????e'? ??- small and large, which do not belong to a? ????? ??????? ??? ?? ??????? ??- woikeus, shall belong to the sons; but all? ?????????? ? ?? ?? ??????? e\?, the rest of the property shall be fairly??? ???? ????? ????, ?? ?’ ??- divided and the sons, no matter how?? ??????? ????? ???e'???- many, shall each receive two parts,? ???õ?, ??? ???????? ??? ?- while the daughters, no matter how?? ?????, ??????? ?’ ?????, ??- many, shall each receive one part.? ??????? ????????, ??? ?- ? ??????????, ??????? ?’ ???- ??, ???? ?????? ????????. 
According to Y. Garlan, this passage shows that Gortynian slaves ‘could challenge any 
arbitrary moves by their master with their own rights of “possession” over the house 
in which they lived, their herds, and probably other goods of a similar kind.’53 Many 
scholars have been struck by the fact that the house and cattle of a slave appear to lie 
outside the patrimony taken over by the sons, and have arrived at a similar conclusion 
to Garlan, namely that the slave must possess legal rights to defend his property against 
interference by his owner.54 S. Link, however, has pointed out several intractable prob-
ﬁ ne: see Kristensen (n. 5) 74. This is an important example of the Code stating things bluntly and 
relying upon the contextual knowledge of the Gortynian reader.
53 Garlan (n. 3) 100.
54 Willetts (n. 1) 14; Brixhe–Bile (n. 3) 96 describe the woikeus’ rights as ‘usufruit d’une maison, bétail, 
biens divers,’ cf. p. 97 (‘il a usufruit d’une maison, dont le mobilier n’est pas partagé lors de la mort 
du maître’). Lévy (n. 3) 35 claims ‘[l]e woikeus, qui a ainsi une personalité juridique, peut aussi 
posséder des biens, dont n’héritent pas les héritiers de son maître.’ Davies (n. 4) 316 writes ‘[t]he 
implication is that a woikeus who dwelt in the countryside (…) had ﬁ rst call on use, and presumably 
possession, of house and beasts.’ R. Koerner, Inschriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechischen 
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lems with this assumption. First of all, the wording of the law does not imply that the 
property held by woikeis cannot be inherited. Rather, it makes a distinction between 
two types of property in the patrimony: (1) property that can only be inherited by the 
sons; (2) property that can be inherited by both sons and daughters, shared out in a 2:1 
ratio. In category (1) are the houses in town, and the contents of the houses apart from 
those occupied by a woikeus; and the cattle, apart from that possessed by the woikeus. 
Everything else belongs to category (2), which can be split among both male and female 
heirs. In other words, the law does not stipulate that the woikeus and his possessions 
cannot be inherited, only that they do not belong to this special category of property 
earmarked for the sons alone. By implication, the house in which a woikeus dwells, and 
the cattle he possesses all belong to the second category of property, which can be split 
among both male and female heirs.55 Second, as Link points out, if the woikeus actually 
owned (rather than simply possessed) his property, it would have been superﬂ uous to 
state that this could not be inherited – this would be perfectly self-evident.56
What is the rationale lying behind this rule? There are two good reasons why the 
law seeks to create these separate categories of property in the patrimony. The ﬁ rst is 
that females can marry and thus move into a house with their husband, whereas males 
need a house of their own in which to live and raise a family.57 Special care is therefore 
taken to guarantee via legislation that the sons will have somewhere appropriate to 
live. The second lies in the particular nature of Gortynian society. One common Cretan 
institution was the andreion, a common-mess for male citizens linked to the military 
life of the community.58 As in Sparta, there was a speciﬁ c need for adult male citizens 
to attend the mess on a regular basis, and this necessitated the sons having a house in 
the town in which to dwell. If a son’s share of the patrimony included a country house 
but no dwelling in town, this could inhibit his ability to participate in the normal social 
and military life of the male citizenry. Read in this context, it is clear why the law takes 
special pains to guarantee that the sons will have a dwelling in town speciﬁ cally.
What about the house in which a woikeus is living – why is it not included in cat-
egory (1) of property? One plausible explanation is that this dwelling was not of the 
same standard as the town houses in which a free citizen would live, and thus could 
be exempted from category (1) and divided among both male and female heirs along 
Polis, ed. K. Hallof (Cologne, Weimar & Vienna, 1993) 499 is uncertain which party (the woikeus 
or the heirs) has the stronger rights.
55 Link (n. 3) 34–5; Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 64–70 provides a useful analysis of this passage. Slaves as well as 
cattle seem to be implied as inheritable property in the word ????õ? at IC IV 72 V 39 (Lévy [n. 3] 
32; Brixhe–Bile [n. 3] 92). Willetts translates this as ‘livestock’ but it is better rendered as ‘mortal’ 
property (i. e. slaves and animals), as opposed to produce, clothing, and so on mentioned in lines 
39–41. Lévy (n. 3) 32 n. 22 points out the opposite term ??????? ??????? in IC IV 76 B 8–9.
56 Link (n. 3) 35.
57 Gagarin (n. 6) 20 has a not dissimilar view of the function of the law, but differs on the matter of 
the ‘rights’ of the slave. Cf. Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 69.
58 For the andreion as a pan-Cretan institution, see Chaniotis (n. 26) 184 with n. 40. Further discussion 
in relation to Gortyn in Davies (n. 15) 166–7.
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with everything else.59 In other words, the law aims to provide the sons with suitable 
dwellings in town, but not to apportion to the sons alone every last dwelling their father 
might have owned; it thus prevents the sons from claiming an unfair proportion of the 
patrimony. On this interpretation, the focus of the law is not on the rights of the woikeus, 
but on the need for sons to have town houses after the death of their father. The woikeus 
can clearly live in a dwelling and possess property, but there is no sign that this was a 
formal right which the woikeus could defend in court.
Our ﬁ nal text deals with the order of succession. It stipulates that property is to pass 
to lineal descendants, and if the line of descendants is exhausted, it is to pass to col-
lateral relatives, with males taking precedence. In the unlikely scenario that a man dies 
without any descendants or relatives to inherit the property, it is to pass to ‘??? ??????, ??????? ?’????? ? ??????’, that is, ‘those of the woikia (household) who are the klaros.’
Text E: IC IV 72 V 9–28
e\ ?’ ???????? ???? ? ???- when a man or a woman dies,?, ?? ??? ?’ e\? ???? ?  ? ?? ??- if there be children or children’s???? ????? ? ? ?? ?????? ??- children or children’s children’s???, ?????? ???[?] ?? ?????- children, they are to have the??. palmula ?? ?? ??? ????? e\? ?????- property. And if there be none of?, ?{?}??????? ?? ?õ ????????- these, but brothers of the deceased ??? ???? ???[?]??õ? ????- and brothers’ children or brothers’? ? ?? ?????? ?????, ????- children’s children, they are to have?? ???? ?? ???????. palmula ?? ?? ?? the property. And if there be????? e\? ??????, ???????? ?- none of these, but sisters of? ?õ ??????????? ??? ????- the deceased and sisters’ children?? ????? ? ?? ?õ? ?????? ??- or sisters’ children’s children, ???, ?????? ???? ?? ?????- they are to have the property.??. palmula ?? ?? ?? ????? e\? ??????, And if there be none of these,??? ?’ ????????? ??? ?’ e\? ?? ??- they are to take it up, to whom ??????, ?????? ?????e'???- it may fall as source of the property.?. palmula ?? ?? ?? ???? ???????????- And if there should be no kinsmen,?, ??? ??????? ??????? ?’ those of the woikia who are ????? ? ??????, ??????? ?- the klaros are to have??? ?? ???????. the property.
Some scholars have thought that ‘those of the woikia who are the klaros’ must refer to 
the slaves left behind, and that the rule gives slaves a place in the order of succession. 
These slaves, it is contended, would become free and divide the property between them.60 
59 Greek comparanda are not numerous, but cf. the dwelling of Eumaeus in which he entertains Odys-
seus at the beginning of book 14 of the Odyssey. In the US South, slave families often occupied 
small cabins that were not of the same standard at the houses of their owners.
60 Willetts (n. 1) 15; Gagarin (n. 6) 27–8.
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Most scholars have opposed this conclusion. The text does not mention slaves, but rather 
‘those of the woikia who are the klaros’, which would be a very roundabout way of 
referring to the slaves left behind, even by the elliptical standards of the Code. Given 
that slaves seem to be included as inheritable property in IC IV 72 V 39, and that they 
are unable to inherit property in IC IV 72 VI 56–VII 10, the possibility that they could 
take over their owner’s property in this fashion seems rather remote. This phrase has 
normally been interpreted as referring to neighbouring families that probably belonged 
to the same tribe as the family of the deceased, although it is difﬁ cult to be certain.61 
Here again, our lack of contextual, extra-epigraphic knowledge about Gortynian society 
precludes conﬁ dent answers to every last riddle contained in the legal texts.
Let us sum up this section. It is clear that in Gortyn, slaves were allowed to form 
unions, live with their partners, have children and possess property. These unions were 
not entirely informal, for the law apportioned slave children to different slaveowners 
depending on the status of the union. Beyond this, however, we may hunt in vain for 
special legal rights possessed by Gortyn’s slaves. The Code is perfectly capable of stating 
that a certain person possesses a certain right in a certain situation62, but this never seems 
to occur in relation to slaves. Much remains to be said about how these marriages may 
have functioned in practice, but from a legal point of view, Gortyn does not lie outside 
our cross-cultural paradigm of slave unions where sexual unions between slaves could 
be referred to using the vocabulary of free marriage and involve the accumulation of 
possessions by the slave spouses, without any sense of the slaves gaining legal rights. 
This conclusion, however, raises a further problem: why did Gortynian slaveowners 
allow their slaves to marry? Was it for benevolent reasons, or did it serve their material 
interests? And if so, were the slaves merely passive spectators to the managerial strate-
gies of their owners?
IV. The Rationale Behind Slave Marriages: The Slaveowner’s Point of View
Two good reasons exist which help to explain why slaveowners in Gortyn were acting 
in their own interests in allowing their slaves to marry. The ﬁ rst is the use of marriage 
as an incentive towards good behaviour. In a recent study, Katsari and Dal Lago have 
61 Finley (n. 2) 137; Brixhe–Bile (n. 3) 88; Kristensen (n. 1) 21; Chaniotis (n. 26) 183; Davies (n. 
4) 320. Willetts (n. 1) 15 n. 93 believes that the property will go to the household ‘serfs’ and cites 
an interesting parallel from early-modern Greece, where following the exhaustion of the line of a 
Turkish notable the local peasants took over his property. Willetts’ point is entirely dependent upon 
viewing the status of the woikeis as somehow analogous to that of these Greek peasants. As we have 
seen above, however, woikeis are slaves in the full property sense, and thus legally very different 
from these peasants. His parallel, if anything, supports the interpretation of the scholars mentioned 
at the beginning of this note.
62 E. g. IC IV 72 II 33–6 (captors of a seducer who is not ransomed can deal with him as they wish); 
VI 5–7 (a son can sell or pledge his own items of property) VII 50–VIII 12 (various rights regarding 
choice of marriage partner for the heiress).
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shown that the managerial strategies advocated by Roman agronomists in many ways 
resemble the system of ‘Paternalism’ well known from the American South.63 In such a 
system slaves are motivated by a predictable array of incentives and sanctions imposed by 
their owner. Incentives might include better food and clothes, positions of responsibility 
and praise, or the capacity to form unions with other slaves, live in a family dwelling, 
and possess a plot on which to grow food for personal consumption or exchange. Sanc-
tions might include whipping, starvation, sexual violence, sale, and a variety of other 
punitive measures. Slaveowners could point to the content of the incentive measures 
as evidence for their benevolent, ‘paternalistic’ attitude, but this obscures the fact that 
such concessions were rarely given altruistically, but form one half of a cynical and 
manipulative form of coercion. Leanne Hunnings has recently shown that slave man-
agement in the Odyssey contains all these ingredients.64 Composed for a slaveholding 
elite, the Odyssey invariably shows this elite in a favourable light, focusing more on 
incentive-related behaviour than punitive measures.65 Nevertheless, the slave Eumaeus 
can imagine being granted a house, a wife, and a plot of his own in return for loyal 
service (Od. 14.61–7; 21.213–16; cf. 24.383–90). Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, dating 
several centuries after the Homeric poems, displays much the same approach. Among 
the various incentives Ischomachos recommends to Socrates as methods of motivating 
slaves, the opportunity to breed looms large (Xen. Oec. 9.5; cf. 13.6–10). If we apply 
the same rationale to Gortyn, it is obvious why allowing a slave to marry could serve 
a master’s interests. Marriage did not only have anticipatory beneﬁ ts for slaveholders; 
it provided retrospective advantages as well, in most cases adding to the slaveholder’s 
wealth if children resulted from the union and granting the slaveholder further leverage 
over his slave’s behaviour by the tacit threat posed to the welfare of the child and the 
unity of the slave family by the slaveholder’s powers of ownership ([Arist]. Oec. 1.5.6).
There is a further reason why the encouragement of slave families makes sense from 
the point of view of the slaveholding classes. As we have seen, Gortyn formed one of a 
patchwork of Cretan slave systems that Aristotle rather reductively lumped together in 
his discussion of the so-called Cretan Politeia and compared to helotage. One charac-
teristic of helotic slave systems is a high incidence of slavebreeding and a relative lack 
of augmentation of the slave supply from abroad. This ﬁ ts well with our understanding 
of the Cretan economy which, if not as ‘primitive’ as was once thought, at least was not 
characterised by the high levels of foreign trade found in communities such as Athens, 
63 E. Dal Lago & C. Katsari, ‘Ideal models of slave management in the Roman world and the ante-
bellum American south’ in E. Dal Lago & C. Katsari (edd.) Slave Systems Ancient and Modern 
(Cambridge, 2008) 187–213.
64 L. Hunnings, ‘The Paradigms of Execution: Managing Slave Death from Homer to Virginia’ in R. 
Alston, E. Hall & L. Profﬁ tt (edd.) Reading Ancient Slavery (London & New York, 2011) 51–71.
65 For Homeric slavery as an idealised abstraction of reality see W.G. Thalmann, The Swineherd and 
the Bow. Representations of Class in the Odyssey (Ithaca & London, 1998) 13–107.
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and which would have been a prerequisite of any system of esclavage marchandise.66 
Research by American historians into the supply structure of US slavery has highlighted 
the key role of the slave family in the self-perpetuation of the slave population. Even 
before the closure of foreign slave supplies in 1808, 80 % of the slave population of the 
American South was ‘home grown’, and this proportion increased thereafter to 99 % by 
1860.67 This birth rate was not primarily due to ‘stud farms’ or rampant sexual exploita-
tion of female slaves by their owners, but largely to the ubiquity of the slave family as 
a social institution.68 In a helotic system of slavery, we must therefore expect the slave 
family to have been the social mechanism responsible for successfully reproducing the 
slave population, and the Gortynian servile family arrangements may well reﬂ ect this. In 
Sparta and elsewhere, certain rules preventing the sale of slaves abroad make best sense 
as a means of preventing the numerical erosion of slave populations that were essentially 
‘home grown’ and were not greatly augmented by external supply.69 
V. The Role of the Slaves: A View from Below70
Thus far, the rationale holds true. But why do we ﬁ nd arrangements in Gortyn whereby 
slaves might marry outside the oikos of their owner? In such arrangements, children of 
the union might in certain circumstances belong to another slaveholder or inherit free 
status. Such arrangements hardly appear desirable from a slaveholder’s point of view. 
The answer, I think, lies in those responsible for instigating the relationship in the ﬁ rst 
place. Apart from the occasional rare document,71 our body of knowledge on Greek 
66 On the classical Cretan economy, see the studies in A. Chaniotis (ed.) From Minoan Farmers to Ro-
man Traders. Sidelights on the Economy of Ancient Crete (Stuttgart, 1999); see also Perlman (n. 3); 
Davies (n. 15). B. Erickson, ‘Archaeology of Empire: Athens and Crete in the Fifth Century B.C.’ 
AJA 109.4 (2005) 619–63 makes a case for greater optimism regarding foreign contacts, but even 
in his revised picture Cretan foreign trade remains minimal and localised.
67 R.W. Fogel & S.L. Engerman, Time on the Cross (Boston & Toronto, 1974) 23.
68 Fogel & Engerman (n. 67) 78–86; 126–44.
69 Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 127 suggests the Gortynian slave family was a means of maintaining the servile popula-
tion numerically. For the rules against selling helots abroad, see Ducat (n. 19) 23; Luraghi (n. 9) 229. 
I disagree with Mafﬁ  (n. 7) 120 n. 103 that the possibility of selling slaves at Gortyn implies links 
with the wider Aegean slave market; it is quite possible that most Gortynian slaves sold were home-
born and there was minimal contact with foreign markets. The same probably goes for Sparta, where 
slaves could be sold, but not abroad, and slaves from abroad were rarely bought-in to supplement 
the helot population. There is no explicit evidence that Cretan slaves could not be sold abroad (like 
Sparta), but this may perhaps be implied by Strabo 12.3.4, although the sense is rather uncertain, 
and the source rather late.
70 For the necessity to study Greek slavery from multiple perspectives beyond the legal rights of 
slaveowners, see K. Vlassopoulos, ‘Two images of ancient slavery: the “living tool” and the 
“koinônia”’ in E. Herrmann-Otto (ed.) Sklaverei und Zwangsarbeit zwischen Akzeptanz und Wider-
stand (Hildesheim, 2011) 467–77.
71 See E.M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2006) 256–8.
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slavery derives predominantly from the slaveholding classes. It is too easy to think of 
slaves as the passive instruments of their masters’ wills; but more balanced evidence 
from other slaveholding cultures shows that this sort of interpretation is not at all cred-
ible. Greek slaves, like slaves in any other culture, interacted with people beyond the 
conﬁ nes of their master’s oikos, including other slaves, and liaisons must doubtless have 
ensued. That slaves pursued love-affairs and tried to gain their masters’ assent to help 
in turning these into serious unions is explicitly envisaged in Menander’s Heros. Here, 
a slave, Daos, bewails his love-life to his friend Getas, a slave who belongs to another 
owner (lines 15–20)72:
GETAS:  What’s that you say? Are you in love?
DAOS:  I’m in love.
GETAS:  Your master is allowing you more than
 Double rations. That’s bad, Daos; you’re probably over-eating.
DAOS: I suffer in my heart when I see the girl;
 She was raised alongside me, she’s innocent,
 She’s of my station, Getas.
GETAS:  Is she a slave?
DAOS: Yes – sort of – in a certain manner.
As the discussion proceeds, it becomes clear that although serving Daos’ master and 
having been brought up in his household, the girl, Plangon, is not strictly a slave, but an 
indentured servant working-off her deceased father’s debts alongside her brother.73 When 
Getas asks what Daos has actually done to achieve his desires, Daos replies (lines 41–4):
DAOS: Herakles! Not anything treacherous
 Or underhand. I’ve talked to my master
 And he promised he would speak 
 To her brother and let her cohabit with me.
Fiction as this may be, and written by a member of the slaveowning classes rather than 
by a slave, the discussion envisaged between the two slaves nevertheless has a strong 
sense of verisimilitude (cf. Plaut. Cas. 68–78; Mil. 1007–9; Ter. Ad. 972–3). It is the 
sort of scenario that must have occurred in all Greek slave systems, albeit leaving little 
historical trace in our sources, and it is precisely what we ﬁ nd in cultures where exten-
sive evidence has been preserved from the mouths of the slaves themselves, such as 
the antebellum US South. Slave marriages, I would contend, must often (and perhaps 
usually) have resulted from relationships initiated by the slaves themselves, not arranged 
72 My translation is based on the text of F.H. Sandbach (ed.) Menandri reliquiae selectae (Oxford, 
1972). 
73 For the legal status of the girl, see Harris (n. 71) 249–69. Because she is not technically a slave, 
consent to establish the union must be gained from her brother, hence the restoration of ??? ??????? 
at line 44.
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by their owners; but the slaves must then have had to gain the consent of their masters 
to ‘marry’ their partner. 
Comparative data as ever helps to reﬁ ne our approach. In a valuable study of slave 
unions in 19th century South Carolina, Emily West has illustrated the continuous push-
and-pull between slaveholders (who wished to control as many aspects of their slaves’ 
lives as they could) and their slaves (who wished to ﬁ nd their own marriage partners 
and control their own family life as far as possible). Several conclusions of her study are 
apposite to our study of Gortyn. First, she has shown an almost universal disinclination 
on behalf of slaveholders towards the establishment of unions between slaves of differ-
ent owners, what she calls ‘cross-plantation’ marriages.74 Slaveholders overwhelmingly 
preferred unions established within their own holdings. Yet this contrasts starkly with 
the recorded frequency of cross-plantation marriages. West’s sample of data from South 
Carolina revealed that a striking 35.5 % of slave unions were cross-plantation marriages 
between slaves belonging to different masters.75 Slaveholders ultimately permitted such 
a high number of these unions because they recognised the need to grant certain con-
cessions in order to keep their slaves motivated, increase the slave stock, and maintain 
the benevolent and patriarchal image they wished to project.76 A further illuminating 
observation is the lack of passivity on behalf of the slaves, few of whom entered into 
marriages arranged by their owners, most opting to make the most of opportunities to 
ﬁ nd marriage partners for themselves. One ex-slave remarked:
A nigger had a hell of a time gittin’ a wife durin’ slavery. If you didn’t see one on 
de place to suit you and chances was you didn’t suit them, why what could you 
do? Couldn’t spring up, grab a mule and ride to de next plantation widout a written 
pass. S’pose you gits your marster’s consent to go? Look here, de gal’s marster got 
to consent, de gal got to consent, de gal’s daddy got to consent, de gal’s mammy 
got to consent. It was a hell of a way.77
Despite these difﬁ culties, many slaves went to remarkable lengths to initiate romantic 
relationships with slaves belonging to other owners and ultimately marry them, as the 
statistics bear out, with more-or-less a third of slave marriages conforming to this type. 
It is impossible to discover any historical details of a comparable nature from Gortyn, 
but the institution of servile marriage referred to in the Code must have been shaped by 
both slaveholders and the slaves themselves. I see no reason to suppose that Gortynian 
slaveholders need have viewed out-of-household unions any more favourably than their 
American counterparts, and the fact that the Code envisages the legal problems engen-
dered by such unions hints at the role of slaves themselves in establishing them. Nor 
can we rule out the possibility that these unions were potentially quite common. Since 
74 West (n. 39) 50–5.
75 West (n. 39) 46; see also pp. 47–50.
76 West (n. 39) 51.
77 Andy Marion, quoted in West (n. 40) 30. Marion, it should be noted, lived on a plantation of seventy-
two slaves. Evidently, slaves could be just as choosy about partners as anyone else.
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Gortyn’s slave system depended upon breeding rather than imports for the numerical 
perpetuation of the slave population, it seems reasonable to conjecture that greater lati-
tude toward the establishment of slave unions probably existed in helotic systems than 
in poleis such as Athens, Corinth, Aegina and so on, where slaves could be imported 
cheaply and the rationale behind fostering the slave family as a social institution was 
not as strong.78
VI. The Peculiarity of Gortynian Slave Marriages
This leaves us with one ﬁ nal problem: was Gortyn unique in the Greek world in per-
mitting slave marriages beyond the conﬁ nes of a single oikos? On the one hand, no in-
scribed laws of this sort survive from other Greek communities, and thus the Gortynian 
legislation appears to be unique. Indeed, some scholars have taken the absence of such 
material elsewhere as a sign of Gortyn’s peculiarity.79 Other evidence, however, should 
force us to temper our enthusiasm for such sweeping solutions. First of all, a passage 
of Herodotus seems to imply that unions between slaves and free persons were nothing 
unusual in the Greek world. He claims (1.173) that the Lycians are strange insofar as 
they describe their lineage in relation to their female ancestors, and that the child of a 
union between a citizen woman and a slave was born free and legitimate, whereas the 
child of a male citizen and a foreign woman or concubine was deemed illegitimate. 
Apparently, the notion that free and slave might have children did not in itself cause 
Herodotus to raise his eyebrows. More telling is a passage in Plato’s Laws (11. 930d–e): 
Whenever there is agreement regarding parentage of a child, but there is need for 
a judgement as to which parent it should follow, if a female slave has intercourse 
with a male slave or a free man or a manumitted slave, the offspring of the 
female slave shall wholly belong to her master; if a free woman has intercourse 
with a male slave, the child shall belong to the male slave’s master. If someone 
has a child with their own female or male slave, and the fact should be conspicu-
ously clear, the ofﬁ cials for women shall send the child of the woman out of the 
country along with the father; and the Nomophylakes shall send away the man’s 
child along with its mother.
If Gortyn’s laws on servile unions between slaves of different owners or even between 
slaves and free persons were so unusual (or even sui generis), we must conclude that 
Plato had read the Gortyn Code himself. That would indeed be remarkable. But it is far 
more likely that he was creating an imaginary rule designed to discourage a widespread 
(and in his eyes deplorable) practice: unions between free persons and slaves, and from 
78 See D.M. Lewis, ‘The market for slaves in the ﬁ fth and fourth century Aegean: Achaemenid Anatolia 
as a case study’ in E.M. Harris, D.M. Lewis & M. Woolmer (edd.) Markets, Households and City-
States in the Ancient Greek Economy (CUP, forthcoming).
79 See note 31 above.
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what we can see in this passage as apparently particularly inappropriate, sexual relations 
between people and their own slaves.80 Sexual interaction across status boundaries is 
very much what we ﬁ nd in 19th century America, and exactly what we ﬁ nd described in 
the Gortyn Code; and we have already seen that Near Eastern societies contemporary 
to 5th century Gortyn faced similar problems due to the existence of complex servile 
unions.81 However, a note of caution is due when we consider ‘marriages’ between slaves 
and free persons. We too often associate the term ‘free’ with ‘elite’, but it is hardly likely 
that in either Gortyn or Athens slaves ever ‘married’ members of the upper classes. Far 
more plausible is interaction with the lower orders, and in particular with manumitted 
slaves. Manumitted slaves are the least likely sector of society to feel reluctant about 
marrying slaves, and the most likely to have social contact with them; in Gortyn, they 
seem to have dwelt in a speciﬁ c place called Latosion (IC IV 78).82 It seems reasonable 
that if we wish to speculate on the circumstances wherein unions between slaves and 
free persons in Gortyn might have arisen, social interactions in Latosion represent the 
most likely place to start looking.
Conclusions
Gortyn’s rules on slave marriages have long been viewed as a peculiarity in the history 
of Greek slavery. However, a more careful look at the individual provisions, evaluated 
against a comparative overview of parallel institutions in other slave systems, shows 
something quite different. These rules did not grant or acknowledge rights for slaves, but 
were chieﬂ y aimed at clarifying the property rights of free citizens in complex scenarios 
where disputes over ‘who owns what’ might have led to conﬂ ict and litigation. In many 
ways, these rules display solutions to the sort of problems that existed in other slave 
systems elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean world. That is not to say that Gortynian 
slavery was similar to slavery in Athens: in social and organisational terms, the two 
systems were completely different, and even legally speaking, slave status in Gortyn 
was tailored to its local conditions in a way that made it quite distinct from its Attic 
counterpart. For instance, the testimony of slaves in Gortyn could prevail over that of 
free persons (IC IV 72 II 15–16), whereas Athenian slaves were generally not permitted 
to bear witness without having been tortured. That should not, however, obscure the fact 
80 See G. Morrow, Plato’s Law of Slavery in its Relation to Greek Law (Urbana, 1939) 94. Plato would 
have been ashamed of his student Aristotle, if we can credit the story that the latter had a child by 
one of his slaves (Timaeus FGrHist 566 F 157).
81 See note 45 above. The Near Eastern examples in this note raise another possible way of dealing 
with such unions, that is, by private agreement in a case-by-case fashion rather than by public law. 
Such agreements would not be committed to durable media like stone, and this perhaps explains the 
apparent uniqueness of Gortyn.
82 See R.F. Willetts, ‘Freedmen at Gortyna’ CQ n.s. 4.3 (1954) 216–19; Chaniotis (n. 26) 188 n. 63 
with references, defending the normal restoration ?õ? ??????[?????]. For foreigners, see (n. 15) 
162.
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that we are dealing with the same basic legal status in both regions: slaves, owned by 
their masters and lacking legal rights, not serfs with various enforceable legal privileges.
Looking beyond legal issues to the social background of slavery, a comparative 
perspective allows us to see the institution of slave marriage as a rational and advan-
tageous strategy from the point of view of the slaveholding classes, that is, once it is 
seen as part of a system of control which depended upon a mixture of incentives and 
sanctions to keep slaves in line, and as a necessary strategy to maintain a numerically 
robust workforce. Yet there is every likelihood that the institution of servile marriage, of 
which we catch glimpses in Gortyn’s laws, was shaped by a dynamic interaction between 
masters and slaves, and was not simply imposed from above upon a passive workforce. 
Nonetheless, we ﬁ nd reﬂ ected in the sphere of law the interests of slaveowners alone. 
Gortyn’s laws dealing with slave marriages are, in a sense, a matter of rights, but rights 
for slaveowners, not slaves.
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